American CE-II in Poland. Lesson sixteen

Barrack Obama has previously hinted in September 2009 that he would revise the plans for a missile base in Poland, but someone had clearly managed to persuade him to pursue Bush’s plans. However, it was not a valid argument Russia Today had about the United States having so many missile bases around which could shoot down the Iranian missiles because the Iranian missiles would big circle navigate over northern latitudes (latitudes or west-east stretches) to reach the United States.

It may also be that the Americans will be forced to shoot down Iranian nuclear missiles over the Russian sky. Intercontinental nuclear weapons missiles have high parabolic trajectories and travel at a speed of 3 miles per second (6 km/s). A missile with only a kinetic effect can not easily be remote controlled in its parabolic trajectory against a target in its highest altitude that travels maybe as much as 45 degrees in the opposite direction of an enemy missile at a speed of mach 17,6 (approximately 13,000 miles per hour or 22,000 km/h) towards an American multi-million people city.

If we assume that the United States would be willing to sacrifice a substantial portion of their satellites due to the Nuclear EMP effect, in exchange for saving a big US city. A nuclear anti-nuclear missile would have to detonate as close to the enemy nuclear missile as 550 yards (500 meters) in order to stop it in its deadly trajectory. Fortunately, the American Anti-Nuclear missile CE-II Exo (Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle) has only a kinetic effect.

The Americans themselves said that they had technical difficulties with the intended missile shield in Europe.

Interestingly, Putin has not mentioned anything about that US anti-nuclear weapons missiles in the future from Poland could shoot down their targets over the Baltic countries or over Russia to intercept a hypotethic Iranian missile with its aim London. For example, from Romania or Bulgaria, you would have to shoot down an Iranian ballistic missile with its aim London over central Sweden or Norway. If the nuclear weapons missile cross the Barents Sea with its aim New York it has to be shot down approximately over Greenland. Whether the target is London or New York, the nuclear missile has to big circle navigate over parts of Russia.

It is probably so that the US missile base must be located in the Czech Republic or southern Poland, and that the US Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle then intercepts an Iranian nuclear missile with its goal New York over Greenland. Unless the nuclear missile crosses the North Sea with its target London, which in this case allows the downing of the nuclear missile over the Baltics or Russia.

The power of two more or less frontally colliding missiles partially level each others out. Plutonium exposed to friction and heat becomes strongly radioactive and radioactive material may contaminate large areas on our soil, if and when the Iranian missile is shot down in its trajectory on its way to London. That is if the plutonium does not burn up in the atmosphere.

Any trajectory missiles are detected at an early stage with e.g. satellites with IR-sensors for them to be able to intercept enemy missiles in time.

An American AN/TPY-2 ground radar is also in operation at Kürecik since 2012 in eastern Turkey, and it is an early missile warning radar station with a range of up to 620 miles (1,000 km). AN/TPY-2 is usually combined with THAAD, which has to shoot down its target “close to its belt”. THAAD is a tactical army system that is developed to shoot down short and medium-range ballistic missiles in the descending phase. But THAAD will not be able to shoot down intercontinental nuclear missiles. An AN/TPY-2 radar with its 620 miles range can not detect objects any further away than the southern Caspian Sea.

A Space-based IR sensor is required. The sensors for an interceptor launched from Poland that are to be used against nuclear targets travelling over the Greenland area must have outstanding features, since they do not even know which US city is the target. Speeding up to the nuclear missile at an angle of about 30 degrees from behind will not be easy to achieve. A mid-course radar is supposed to be located near the American missile base in southern Poland or in the Czech Republic. The interceptor must be programmed before starting. You must first know what altitude the nuclear missile is flying at and at what speed and at what stage it is in its trajectory and in exactly what direction it is flying, so that the Anti-Nuclear missile knows where to intercept it.

The Americans have less than 6 minutes of warning and preparation time if the American missile base is located in southern Poland while the Iranian is located near the Caspian Sea in the north of Iran. The Iranian nuclear missile must big circle navigate. Then the missile must be shot down somewhere over Greenland’s east coast or over the north Arctic Ocean.

The systems used for the European Missile Shield must be the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) with an Interceptor (GBI) called CE-II, as well as a land-based version of SM-3. The SM-3 is very small for an ABM, about 3,300 pounds (1,500 kg). But an interception of an Iranian missile with the SM-3 will not happen over the north Arctic Ocean, it completely falls outside of the missile’s performance capability. But with a CE-II you can shoot down an Iranian missile that has a trajectory over northern Europe, and shoot them down over the Baltics or Russia.

The CE-II can also intercept by flying over the nuclear missile and ”push” it away from its path from behind. You can read the following online (Wikipedia): “On April 30, 2014, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the system may not be operational any time soon because “its development was flawed”. It says the GBI missile is “capable of intercepting a simple threat in a limited way.” ”

With ”In a limited way”, they are likely to mean that the angle can not be too big to be able to hit the target either from the rear or from the front. The CE-II interceptor requires assistance from ground radar and space-based sensors against more complex and sophisticated targets. The CE-II interceptor has an Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).

If the Russians try to wipe out the American ground facilities in Europe with cruise missiles, I do not see how they could manage without knowing in advance when the Iranians send their nuclear weapons missiles against the United States or London.

Russia and China jointly agreed in March 2013 that they should coordinate their reaction to the United States plans to expand their missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region. The statement follows the United State’s declaration on March 16 of 2013 by Defense Minister Chuck Hagel, to abolish the construction of the fourth phase of the Missile Defense Shield in Europe in favor of a missile defense shield in Alaska, which would provide the Americans with coverage to resist a North Korean nuclear attack. One of the reasons the Americans intended to scrap phase 4, in other words the intercontinental missile shield in Europe, are the technical difficulties.


What signals do you figure that Obama was sending to Greenland, the Baltic states, Sweden and Norway as he gave a green light to building a missile shield that would effectively shoot down missiles over selected countries, considering that radioactive material would spread over wide areas, to spare London from a nuclear blast?

Or do you think the whole attempt was to keep our countries in the dark about nuclear stuff spreading over selected countries in case the US were to shoot down a nuclear missile?

Note; it is impossible to beforehand determine exactly where to shoot down a missile. The interception point depends on not controllable circumstances. So to say that ”we would shoot it down over the Baltic Sea” is not a valid argument because they do not know in advance exactly where a missile is going to be shot down.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden


Where does Germany get its oil from? Lesson fifteen

Countries mentioned with the biggest partner first in order and the smallest partner last in order.


Saudi-Arabia export: China 13.6%, Japan 11.3%, India 10.7%, US 9.8%, South Korea 9.1%, Singapore 4.7% (2016)

Saudi-Arabia import: China 16.2%, US 15.0%,
Germany 6.3%, Japan 5.3%, UAE 5.0%, South
Korea 4.3% (2016)


Iran export: China 30.1%, India 16.7%, South Korea 9.7%, Turkey 9.5%, Japan 6.8% (2016)

Iran import: UAE 27.4%, China 13.2%, Turkey
7.8%, South Korea 4.3%, Germany 4.0% (2016)


Iraq export: China 25.4%, India 17.3%, US 14.3%, South Korea 12.0%, Italy 6.5%, Greece 6.1% (2016)

Iraq import: China 23.5%, Turkey 23.0%, Iran
20.0%, South Korea 5.0%, US 4.0% (2016)


Kuwait export: South Korea 16.8%, China 14.4%, Japan 9.6%, India 9.2%, US 7.5%, Singapore 5.6% (2016)

Kuwait import: China 14.1%, US 11.9%, UAE 8.3%,
Japan 6.5%, Germany 6.2%, India 5.4%, Italy 5.0%,
Saudi-Arabia 4.4%, South Korea 4.4% (2016)


Qatar export: Japan 20.0%, South Korea 15.5%, India 13.1%, China 8.2%, UAE 5.5%, Singapore 5.3% (2016)

Qatar import: US 13.7%, Germany 9.8%, UAE
9.2%, China 8.6%, Japan 7.2%, UK 5.5%, Saudi
Arabia 4.6%, Italy 4.4% (2016)


United Arab Emirates export: India 9.9%, Iran 8.9%, Japan 8.8%, Switzerland 8.5%, Oman 5.4%, China 5.1% (2016)

United Arab Emirates import: China 7.4%, US
6.9%, India 6.8%, Germany 4.4% (2016)


Bahrain export: Saudi-Arabia 18.3%, UAE 17.5%, US 11.1%, Japan 8.7%, Qatar 4.8%, China 4.2% (2016) Bahrain exports no oil.

Bahrain import: China 9.7%, US 8.6%, UAE 7.4%,
Japan 6.1%, Saudi-Arabia 5.5% (2016) Bahrain is a
net importer of oil.


Libya export: Italy 24.2%, Egypt 21.1%, Spain 9.5%, France 7.8%, Croatia 5%, Netherlands 5%, China 4.3% (2016)

Libya import: China 14.4%, South Korea 13.3%,
Turkey 10.4%, Italy 5.9% (2016)

But what about Germany? Are they to make me believe that Germany export technology to many of those countries without getting anything in return, like oil?

Sadly the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK doesn’t reveal where Germany gets most of its oil from. Apparently from none of the above countries and not from Oman, UK or Norway either. Even though Germany may still buy a percentage of oil from Norway and the United Kingdom for a few years yet, and allthough Germany buys quite much of its oil from Russia but apparently aren’t exporting much goods worth mentioning to Russia, there is a discrepancy between their exports of technology and imports of oil in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK.

The UK export quota to Germany is 10.7 percent of all exports. That’s a big share only second to their export to the US. Their import quota from Germany is 13.6 percent which amounts up to a number one place on the list. The UK produce 933,000 bbl of oil per day and export 632,200 bbl of oil per day, and of that only 154,000 bbl of oil per day are exported to Germany. That will not sustain total German oil consumption by far. Anyway, note that it is not million barrels per day, it’s only in the hundreds of thousands. The UK is Germany’s least important import partner on the important list in the book, in total 4.1 percent of Germany’s total import quota. But the UK is third on the list of Germany’s export partners after the US and France in that order.

But Germany may have put their eggs in multiple baskets. So many that they fly under the radar for oil in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. Of the 11 most important import partners Germany has, Russia isn’t mentioned. Of their 9 export partners you cannot find Russia, but you can find small countries, among them the Netherlands as number 4 in the list.

If you read on the pages for Russia’s main export partners, Germany is number 3 after the Netherlands as number 1 and China as number 2.

As Russia’s import partner number 2 after China we see Germany again. Only Russia’s GDP is 4 trillion dollars and Germany’s is 4.15 trillion dollars.

Something is clearly rotten in the state of Germany. And also in the Netherlands because for Russia the Netherlands is the number 1 export partner, but for the Netherlands Russia is only the number 6 import partner, a mere last in the mentioned list. It just doesn’t add up at all!

I need to mention that Germany exports electricity. 78.86 billion kWh exported electricity. (Germany imports 28.34 billion kWh.) Of the total installed German capacity 42.6 percent comes from fossil fuels, 5.3 percent of the total installed German capacity comes from nuclear fuels, 2.2 percent comes from hydroelectric plants and renewable sources amounts to 49.9 percent of total installed German capacity.

And this is where it gets really funny. In the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019, Germany is said to produce 8.73 billion cubic meters of gas (2015) and the book tells us that Germany import 102.5 billion cu m of gas (2015). That amounts up to 111.23 billion cu m of gas. But they export 32.51 billion cu m of gas and Germany consume 773.2 billion cu m of gas. Their own proved reserves of natural gas is only 41.99 billion cubic meters total. Oh Germany, what are you hiding? Something isn’t right.

Nord Stream is said to be operating two gas pipelines from Russia to Germany with an annual total capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of gas. Apparantly it is for each gas pipeline. Russia’s Gazprom, which supplies the gas, owns 51 percent of Nord Stream, while German, French and Dutch shareholders constitute the remaining owners. Gazprom does not need more than 51 percent of the Nord Stream shares in order for Putin to control Nord Stream in total, as Gazprom is so regimented unilaterally Kremlin loyal and its majority of CEOs are high ranking former Russian militaries posing as members of a board.

Hmm, interesting, Dutch shareholders! How much of Germany’s oil comes from Russia via the Netherlands?

Belgium is a country which has no main oil-producing import partners apart from the US and the UK who imports for their own part. Its biggest import partner is the Netherlands. Belgium imports 639,500 bbl of oil per day. This I suspect should mainly come from Russia via the Netherlands since Russia is not mentioned as one of Belgium’s 7 most important import partners. The UK is the number 5 in declining order. Belgium’s main export partner is Germany, but Belgium doesn’t seem to export any oil, only refined petroleum products according to the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019. They have no natural gas production but they consume 23.01 billion cu m of gas (2015) and they export 1.694 billion cu m of gas (2015). They import 18.81 billion cubic meter of gas (2015) according to the factbook. The import of gas comes from the UK. They are not among Russias 6 main export or 6 main import partners mentioned in the factbook. They are likely to buy their oil from someone who buys it from Russia in their turn.

But to be fair, it is not uncommon for the numbers not to add up in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. It is the same for the UK regarding gas-production, gas-imports, gas-exports and gas-consumption, only not as significant as it is for Germany.

Germany imports 1.837 million bbl of oil per day, a nr 6 in the world. Crude oil proved reserves is only 145.4 million bbl of oil.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaian should according to sane security policy reasonably belong to the ’Russian quota’ since Russia controls the oil pipelines to e.g. Leningrad Oblast. At least as long as there is no oil pipeline in Turkey not controlled by Russia. Germany’s own data from the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) regarding the 33 million tonnes of oil (i.e. 240 million bbl) imported from Russia should instead amount to 43+ million tonnes (i.e. 312+ million bbl) as Germany according to the statistics import 8 million tonnes (i.e. 58+ million bbl) from Kazakhstan and 2 million tonnes (i.e. 14.5+ million bbl) from Azerbaijan.

And most of the oil imported to Germany from the Netherlands should probably also be accounted to import from Russia. But the Netherlands despite being Germany’s number one import partner is belonging to the column called ”Rest of world (-12 countries)”. This shouldn’t be. It should belong to the Russian column and almost all of the oil in the last column must come via the Netherlands. There is just no other way to interpret all the information in this article, and even then it doesn’t add up nearly as good as it should have. As I have said, Russia’s number one export partner is the Netherlands, two places above Germany on the list, and if Germany imports 312 million bbl a year from Russia, ¾ of that which is exported from Russia to the Netherlands, and Germany’s main import partner is the Netherlands… Well, you do the math!

According to the Swedish security blogger Cornucopia? Sweden imports 394,000 bbl of oil a day (2016). That equals 54+ thousand tonnes a day or 19.7+ million tonnes a year. 45 percent of that crude oil comes from Russia and 26 percent comes from Norway.

Since Norway’s export to Germany is nearly exactly twice as much as their export to Sweden according to the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019, our 26 percent oil qouta bought from Norway i.e. 102,440 bbl, should land at 205,000 bbl of Norwegian oil bought by Germany. And it does according to the BMWi.

Since Germany’s total import of oil is 1.837 million bbl of oil per day and the import of oil from Russia is 312+ million bbl per year or 854,795 bbl of oil per day, then the remainder is 982,205 bbl per day they have to get from somewhere else than Russia. As I have stated, 205,000 bbl per day comes from Norway and about 175,000 bbl a day comes from the UK to Germany. That adds up to 602,205 bbl of crude oil they have to get from the rest of the countries on the list above. What they have to get from the rest equals almost 1/3 or 29 percent of the total oil import from every other nation but Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaian, Norway and the UK. The Norwegian and British oil is Brent-oil used to make gasoline from and Germany’s vehicle park is mainly running on diesel.

Sources; CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019; and the blog Cornucopia?; and the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi)

If the numbers in a source lacks a year attached to it it is always to be understood as the year 2016


I want to emphasize that when putting a point in a number followed by the word ”million” like this; 1.837 million, it means 1 837 000. When putting commas in a number like this; 1,602,205 it means that it is the full number 1 602 205 and it is not followed by the word ”million”.

How do you interprete the numbers? Are the Germans hiding something you think?

Or do you think that the numbers are legit? Please motivate your standpoint.

For this task you may use the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK as much as you wish.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden


Sweden. Lesson fourteen

The S-400 Triumph Air defense systems based in Kaliningrad Oblast are now operational in Kaliningrad. The S-400 radar is capable of tracking over a 100 targets at a distance of more than 400 kilometers and take on 12 of these 100 goals at varying ranges, depending on the type of missile used. The missiles that can be used have a range of 400, 250 or 120 km. The 400-kilometer missile can reportedly fly at Mach 12 (9,100 miles/h or 14,700 km/h) with a 40,000 to 50,000-meter maximum flight altitude and must be shot down at high or medium altitude. The S-400 Triumph System is optimized to shoot down either ballistic missiles or cruise missiles but can also be used against signals surveillance aircraft and radar planes like AWACS. The 400 km missile is said to be able to shoot down even fighter/attack-aircrafts. S-400 Triumph’s Nato report name is SA-21 Growler. The Russians can also utilize fighter aircraft with the R-37 Vympel missiles with a range of 300 km against AWACS.

A ballistic missile is always a surface to surface missile. Iskander-M is actually a semi-ballistic missile, i.e. its flightpath is within the stratosphere. It may be worth considering when discussing range. To fully flee the earth’s gravity it requires a minimum speed of 11 km/s. A rule of thumb is that the lower trajectory up to 45 degrees, the shorter the range of a missile, given the same conditions in other prestanda. A lower trajectory also means that Iskander-M can maneuver throughout its whole flightpath within the stratosphere. Iskander-M can be preprogrammed to avoid air defense missiles by a series of pirouettes in its final phase. The Russians claim that the Iskander-M missile cannot be shot down due to its maneuverability. It would be helpful if we could figure out in what phase of its trajectory one should try to shoot down an Iskander-M, so that it at least isn’t in the phase where it maneuvers the jerkiest when our air defense missile reaches it. I guess time of impact depends on what type of air defense missile system we use.

Most analysts now (2015) assume that the Iskander extended range version with a range of over 600 km must be the Iskander-K cruise missile and not the ballistic missile Iskander-M. Maybe so. But the range of Iskander-M tends to be lowered following after what the Kremlin says for political reasons. Today, many here in Sweden say that the Iskander-M has a range of 400 km. I don’t think so! Additionally, the range of the Iskander-K is most likely also violating the INF agreement, even if the missile is carrying a heavier nuclear warhead.

Should Russia forebode a threat in Europe, specifically an American missile shield, they will take themselves the right to permanently deploy Iskander-M in Kaliningrad Oblast, from which it will pose a threat to Poland and also Germany, not to mention Sweden. The Russian military spokesman, then Colonel Andrey Bobrun, said that the extended Iskander missile is designed for operations against land-based targets such as command centers, force groups, air and missile defense facilities and aircraft at airfields. He also said that; “The weapon systems have high tactical maneuverability and can be delivered [He should mean be transported] by all types of delivery systems, including from aircraft “.

What is most foreboding with Iskander-M is that, in its extended version, it probably covers the Stockholm area within its reach from Kaliningrad. It’s called 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) – Extended Range Version Program, which Putin developed after Bush’s proclamation of America’s right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes and his intended missile base in Poland.

The missiles warhead generally weighs more if it is nuclear, i.e. approximately 750 kg versus 480-700 kg if it’s conventional, so paradoxically it will be the Iskander missile carrying a conventional warhead that clearly violates the INF agreement. It may therefore be that Russia wishes to abolish the INF Treaty for the possibility of extending the range of Iskander-M with conventional explosive charges.

The head of the Russian General Staff, Nikolaj Makarov stated in an article published on November 17, 2011 in the Washington Post that; “Under certain circumstances, local and regional conflicts may escalate into a full-scale war, involving nuclear weapons.” Can it be said any clearer? Putin may have his aim at small non-nuclear and non-NATO countries like Sweden, Finland and Georgia when he spoke of preventive Russian attacks, if Iskander has a range of >500 kilometers with a 750 kg nuclear charge.

Immediately after Makarov’s statement, in November 2011, Russian President Dimitrj Medvedev showed up on Russia Today’s network television media and mentioned in passing the number 500 kilometer range of Iskander-M missiles in conjunction with a declaring that Russia will be forced to resign from the START Treaty if the missile base is built in Poland, and he also mentioned that Russia may or may not build its own missile shield. This figure, 500 km, is completely contrary to what has been said from Russian authorities earlier on. We can only hope that the Russians have reconsidered now. But the core point with an extended range version is that it has a longer range than the previous Iskander-M missile which satisfied the INF agreement.

U.S. Colonel (retired) Sam Gardiner, believes it is unlikely that West at this time has the political will to raise the issue of Iskander on the agenda. The question does not raise interest even in military circles. Gardiner raised the question of Iskander’s range in a seminar he held in both Stockholm and Tallinn for the air force in the region, as well as in the USAF headquarters in Germany. As for the reactions, “he could as well have been talking about the price of oranges on the Asian market,” he said in a private conversation in 2010.



What do you think is more important to Putin with the Iskander-M, to deliver nuclear strikes or to deliver conventional strikes? Motivate your standpoint.

Note that this is more of a philosophical question than a strategic. I want to stimulate your cognition.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

Strategic maskirovka Vs. tactical and operational maskirovka. Lesson thirteen

The importance of strategic maskirovka should not be underestimated, but I personally see it as a second-rate protection measure. I’m not saying I’m ignoring it and never would agree to it, but I’m reluctant to introduce pure strategic maskirovka and prefer open cards. It is probably a national trait.

Maskirovka at a tactical and operational level is a completely different matter. For Swedish conditions it could be about camouflage, heat camouflage, heat dissipation, invisibility cloaks by systems that can imitate the surrounding temperature, and for operational level the spreading of airbases and aircontrol centers and the like. I am entirely for that. But it is symptomatic that the only central and overall strategic plan where the Allies proved to be significantly superior in WWII were during the initial invasion of Normandy, and the planning preceding Normandy.

What preceded the invasion in the form of a major deception with two smokescreens called Operation Bodyguard and Operation Fortitude, however, was not a result of superiority in strategic thinking, but a sneaking and shuffling of the cards and pure luck for the Allies side during the planning, if you ask me.

It was because of the enormous magnitude of the deception, that it was pure luck that they succeeded. A single unfortunate observation by a German agent or by a traitor could have sunk parts of the plan. It didn’t make it any less cunning. It were all about masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and fake signaling.

I also mention that deceptive bombings, staniol tape felling (also called Chaff or Window) to deceive radar systems and large scale air drops of rubber dolls were carried out during D-day from bases in the south-east of England to the Calais area in France. Masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and maybe fake signaling were just forms of regular strategic maskirovka. But the fake signaling costed little in energy, manpower and working hours and was therefore well worth it.

Fake signaling can be switched on to true signaling at a certain point in time or action, and you may be exposed at a later stage of an invasion. The deceptive bombings, the staniol tape felling and the rubber dolls were operational maskirovka and were all justified. The Allies took the Germans by surprise on D-day as they intended to do.

The Germans were themselves devoted to strategic maskirovka on Normandy’s beaches. This made the Allied strategic Maskirovka pointless. Sure enough, the Allies sometimes landed were they could not achieve their intended goal because the target wasn’t there, and in some cases they would land at the wrong place or in dangerous places like the beach strip dubbed Omaha.


The strategic level is about how to win a war. The operational level is about how to win a campaign. The tactical level is about how to win a battle.

Do you think it is meaningless to divide the meaning of Maskirovka into strategic, operational and tactical like I did here? If yes, please motivate your standpoint.

If you think it is meaningful, do you agree on that it was pointless for the Allies to pursue their strategic maskirovka? If no, please motivate your standpoint.

Roger M. Klang, defense political Spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

Who trades with the countries in the Persian Gulf? Lesson twelve

Countries mentioned with the biggest partner first in order and the smallest partner last in order.


Saudi-Arabia export: China 13.6%, Japan 11.3%, India 10.7%, US 9.8%, South Korea 9.1%, Singapore 4.7% (2016)

Saudi-Arabia import: China 16.2%, US 15.0%, Germany 6.3%, Japan 5.3%,
UAE 5.0%, South Korea 4.3% (2016)

Iran export: China 30.1%, India 16.7%, South Korea 9.7%, Turkey 9.5%, Japan 6.8% (2016)

Iran import: UAE 27.4%, China 13.2%, Turkey 7.8%, South Korea 4.3%,
Germany 4.0% (2016)

Iraq export: China 25.4%, India 17.3%, US 14.3%, South Korea 12.0%, Italy 6.5%, Greece 6.1% (2016)

Iraq import: China 23.5%, Turkey 23.0%, Iran 20.0%, South Korea 5.0%,
US 4.0% (2016)

Kuwait export: South Korea 16.8%, China 14.4%, Japan 9.6%, India 9.2%, US 7.5%, Singapore 5.6% (2016)

Kuwait import: China 14.1%, US 11.9%, UAE 8.3%, Japan 6.5%,
Germany 6.2%, India 5.4%, Italy 5.0%, Saudi-Arabia 4.4%, South Korea 4.4%

Qatar export: Japan 20.0%, South Korea 15.5%, India 13.1%, China 8.2%, UAE 5.5%, Singapore 5.3% (2016)

Qatar import: US 13.7%, Germany 9.8%, UAE 9.2%, China 8.6%, Japan 7.2%,
UK 5.5%, Saudi-Arabia 4.6%, Italy 4.4% (2016)

United Arab Emirates export: India 9.9%, Iran 8.9%, Japan 8.8%, Switzerland 8.5%, Oman 5.4%, China 5.1% (2016)

United Arab Emirates import: China 7.4%, US 6.9%, India 6.8%,
Germany 4.4% (2016)

Bahrain export: Saudi-Arabia 18.3%, UAE 17.5%, US 11.1%, Japan 8.7%, Qatar 4.8%, China 4.2% (2016) Bahrain exports no oil.

Bahrain import: China 9.7%, US 8.6%, UAE 7.4%, Japan 6.1%,
Saudi-Arabia 5.5% (2016) Bahrain is a net importer of oil.


As you can see for yourself, China is up there as a trading partner with the countries in the Persian Gulf and is a bigger partner than the US is in most cases.

Source; CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019



What do you think the implications on the nations around the Persian Gulf are now that China is trading so closely with both Sunni-muslim Saudi-Arabia and Shia-muslim Iran?

For this task please remember that the United States has an oil and commodity embargo on Iran, which China ignores most of the time. China is also the main trading partner for Shia-dominated Iraq by 64-69% Shia-Iraqis against 29-34% Sunni-Iraqis.

And please note that the US also are one of the major trading partners for Saudi-Arabia and Iraq in that order, but the US doesn’t trade with Iran.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

Why Syria. Lesson eleven

This is not the full story about Syria, I make no claim that it is!

Following the ”Arabic spring” we saw the ISIS terror organization grow out of it. It is very hard to keep track on the events in Syria because of the many belligerent participators. The protagonists in the Syrian drama are mainly Israel, the United States, Iran, Russia, Turkey, ISIS, the Syrian forces and later on a couple of rebell groups, all of them with their own agenda. Massive smokescreens have been layed in a fog of war by the participators in order to conceal their true intentions or even their own participation in this war and how.

Turkey’s President Erdogan apologized in a letter to President Putin in June 2016 for the downing of a Russian fighter plane somewhere near the border between Turkey and Syria in November 2015. The pilot was killed, according to Putin’s press spokesman. Exactly on which side of the border the fighter Aircraft was shot down is contested.

The letter opened up for a thawing in the icey relations between the two countries. Putin initiated economic sanctions after the downing of the Russian airplane, and he also ended the Russian people’s extensive travelling trips to Turkey. Millions of Russian tourists visit Turkey every year. For a while, it was debated whether there would come a military clash.

Prior to the downing of the airplane, Russia and Turkey had good relations, both in the economic and the political spheres. It was obvious that for Moscow, as well as for Ankara, it would have become too expensive to continue with hostility. The Russian energy giant Gazprom immidiately declared that it was now ready to re-negotiate the construction of a large gas pipeline to Turkey, following the Turkish apology.

What was still unclear was what effect this approach would have on the war in Syria, where Russia and Turkey reportedly actively supported different sides of the fighting.

Russia could probably have predicted the ”Arab Spring” because of the signs of what was the growing size of general Ghadaffi’s ego which was already before notably large. With a shiny drawn sword and shining armor, the peace prize winner Obama went into action on his chivalrously and loyal steed. Finally, a new world would be created through the domino effect.

The US administration, possibly Obama personally, named the Arabic spring early in the operation or even before it was executed. North Africa and the Middle East would develop into a thriving region with associated economic development, peace, security and freedom. Possibly the issue of Israel would also be resolved and Iran be held back.

But above all, the threat from the Libyan-African Gold currency would be cleared away. Ghadaffi believed that the West would voluntarily pay for oil with gold. He was so greedy that he did not even understand that gold is only available in a very limited amount. He must be taken out of the game. The military operation was led by France and the United Kingdom.

Yet another world than the intended was created. And then our brave knight went on doing the mistake to allow ISIS to grow strong. Not because Obama was evil, but because he wanted to oppose Iran and counter Russia’s and Iran’s converging plans to overthrow Israel, etc. Syria was the chessboard. Europe became the loser in this game, but in the long run I think it will be the US which lose influence.

Russia could claim that the United States of America did nothing and even supplied ISIS with weapons. Think about it for a moment. Why was CIA’s ”Operation Timber Sycamore” kept covert by orders from president Obama if the purpose with the operation was to arm the rebel groups? But the Kremlin didn’t mention the fact that Russia together with Iran plotted to destroy Israel and whip up a massive refugee wave to Europe in order to weaken the to Russia and Iran antagonizing West European regimes. The destroying of Israel didn’t succeed, but the latter went way over expectations.


Am I right to point out the relationship between Russia and Turkey first, and not bother about the other players interactions cause they have a predictable pattern in their actions? I was thinking that the Russian-Turkish relationship was the only truly volatile relationship that could go either way at the time. But then again the US armed the ISIS terrorists so that they (hopefully) as good Sunni-Muslims would fight the Shia-Muslim Iranians.

Can you come up with a better explanation for the supposedly arming of the ISIS by the US? Was ISIS allowed to continue to exist so that they can pose a threat to the Iranian forces in Syria? I cannot prove that my fears are true, but if they are, it was an impressive planning by Obama. I would even be inclined to see it as Obama’s biggest achievement during his eight years in the White House except for his war speech when he received the Nobel Peace Prize, and got away with his war speech and walked away with resounding applause, a gold medal and ten million Swedish crowns or so. It was much like a bank robbery complete with the victims’ Stockholm syndrome and all.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

The Abysmal gap. Lesson ten

The abysmal gap between military geostrategists’ views on the world as being a battlefield over strategic hotspots, straits, sea routes, military bases and commodity assets, versus diplomats’ view of geostrategy as a frictional meeting between headstrong dynamic people, is probably the reason for the existence of military attache officials who combine the best of both worlds. Military attaches are usually younger and always low in rank. I can only assume it is the diplomats who rule in the house of diplomats. They shouldn’t be so skird of professionals.

There is thus a difference between geostrategy (military thinking) and geopolitics (diplomatic thinking).

Geo-politic revolves around economics and policies.

Geostrategy is inevitable facts; who has what and where, and who wins a conflict with this what?

Geo-politics also involve commodities and, to some extent, natural resources. Geo-strategy involves natural resources and where they’re at. But there is no absolute division between the two different fields of strategy – geo-politics and geo-strategy.

Almost any fool can conduct geopolitical work. But conducting the work of a geostrategic task is often a privilege for a few briefed men, often high ranking militaries, government leaders and industrialists within a closed circle of people. Nothing is initiated by chance at the top level. On the other hand, the intentions of others and decisive events often gets randomized in crazy interactions.

It is enough that only one party is aware that they have a geostrategic superiority. If they do, then it is possible for them to go out and make geopolitics of it. A fog of war is usually created by the protagonists at selected occasions in any given conflict. But sooner or later, the conflict will return to the origin of the conflict – the geostrategy i.e. the strategic hotspots and natural resources.

Everybody does not agree with me about what makes up a geostrategical task and what makes up a geopolitical task. Some wouldn’t even separate the two into dual significations. This is my definition.


How would you define geo-politics and geo-strategy, are they the same?

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden