2. Cyber espionage. Lesson nineteen

Target Sweden

Ever since the Bush era the National Security Agency (NSA) collects, saves and sometimes reads/listens to selected conversations of millions of French and Spanish and probably also millions of Germans, Swedes and others. Merkel incidentally turned sour when she subsequently in late October 2013 realized that she was probably herself wire-tapped by the NSA. The NSA wired the German head of state Angela Merkel’s phones and 33 other world leaders, at least according to the whistleblower Edward Snowden’s leaked information. The wire-tapping has not been denied by the NSA or the White House. The NSA says they are wire-tapping people to avoid future terrorist acts. Is Merkel a terrorist sympathizer then?

In any case, you can be sure that everything Angela Merkel has said have also been listened in to by someone high up in the US government apparatus, unlike most of the other “noise”. The question is whether they even consider themselves to be competitive without the NSA’s controversial methods any longer.

It seems probable that the Americans will let go of the wire-tapping of the western world’s leaders and the European parliament through the NSA’s “section 702 program” whose aim is foreign individuals on our side of the Atlantic Ocean and most likely also on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. But as for the other European citizens, I do not think we will see any penitence from the Americans. The section 702 program differ from section 215 program which is aimed at citizens’ metadata. What they are interested in with section 215 program is not primarily what is said, instead it is oriented to whatever networks exist, i.e. information about who is calling who, when and how often, according to a Swedish security expert. Section 702 is probably much more thorough. It is usually not as easy to spy on your own people in a democracy from a legal perspective.


Target Germany

An employee of the German intelligence service BND is reported to have spied on behalf of the United States. The man is said to have handed over secret documents to the Americans. These are documents that concerns, among other things, the German political committee that investigates the US intelligence service NSA’s activities in Germany. The 31-year-old employee at the BND intelligence service is said to have collected 218 documents on a USB stick over a period of two years. The United States reportedly has paid him a trivial sum of about 28,000 US dollars in total. The suspected spy scandal was rolled up after suspicions that the man stood in contact with the Russian security service. He was arrested somewhere in the area around Munich and in the subsequent interrogation of him he has admitted that he had sold information to the US.

According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the German Foreign Ministry invited the US Ambassador to ask him to help unravel what has happened. The suspect is suspected of handing the documents to the US, from the “NSA committee” in the German Bundestag. The committee’s task is to examine the extent of NSA’s operations in Germany, and it was appointed after Edward Snowden’s leaked information. Thus data from the committee who is set to examine the US intelligence service may have leaked to the United States. Moreover, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone has, as believed, been wire-tapped. Source; SR; Ekot, July 5, 2014

In July 2014, the German government requested that the highest representative of the US intelligence service (CIA) in Berlin was to leave the country, and this was the last thing I have heard about the controversy.

In the book “The Great Spy Scandal” or ”Pullach intern”, which was first published in 1971 in Germany and 1972 in Sweden, written by the two Der Spiegel journalists Hermann Zolling and Heinz Höhne who were leading experts in intelligence services operating in West and East Germany at the time, it appears that the phenomenon of American political espionage and industrial espionage against (West) Germany has been going on since long before the IT age.

There are only four designated countries that the NSA are not allowed to wire-tap according to secret legal documents from 2010, which Edward Snowden leaked in June 2014. According to the documents, the intelligence agency NSA has had much greater freedom to collect information than previously known, the Washington Post writes. Only the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are exempted from wire-tapping. Among the leaked documents, there is also a list of 193 countries in the world whose governments can be of interest to the NSA, and that is almost all the countries of the world. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may also be wire-tapped.

The special US court whose task it is to monitor the NSA has determined that it is permissible for the NSA to wire-tap all telecommunications traffic that goes to and from interesting spy targets in other countries. But what is more is that according to the Washington Post, the NSA also collects all the communication concerning these interesting spy targets. This means that a much larger group of people are included in the circuit that can be wire-tapped, the Washington Post reports. It fits.


What is app?

But the NSA cannot be allowed to spy indiscriminately on individuals. First, the individual must himself approve the terms of use for various apps, which people sometimes have to do in order for the phone to work as it is intended, since the installation of the app is essential for the mobile’s function. So in practice it is mandatory to let yourself be spied on.

NSA can easily find out where you have been, when you have been there, which route you have taken and they also know what people you have text messaged or talked with and how you look, provided that you have taken pictures that end up in the cloud connected to your mobile phone and computer.

Had it not been up to the user himself to approve the espionage against him/her then everyone could have spied on anyone, especially the United States, and the United States could not have done anything about it without losing its face. It would have become “Bellum omnium contra omnes” = everyone’s war against everyone. Now, the US publicly can push countries to prosecute or extradite cybercriminals for espionage, instead of the United States just sitting silent and idle. All apps may not be used for NSA purposes and their terms of use are not written by the NSA or even by US lawyers.

The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the US military from collecting information about US citizens, and the NSA is too part of the armed forces under the United States Department of Defense.

The above is just a hypothesis but it is highly reasonable and logically derived, because we know that the NSA is engaged in espionage against us, the question is just how and under what forms. There is where we can start to unravel.

I do not know, and I do not think there is anyone in Europe who knows, since it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the terms of use when downloading an app, that one can be spied on by the NSA when approving certain apps. Maybe the UK government and secret intelligence know. But I read in June 2014 that the NSA is focusing on – probably shared – pictures now. Probably they will now focus on already suspected persons, their appearance and clothing and the surroundings where they have been or are, personal associations, photo associations, timing of moving activity and camera activity, and modes of transport e.g. train, bus, car or motorcycle. The NSA keeps track on where some of the suspects resides via their mobile phones’ GPS apps, like Family Locator, an app among many that requires access to your personal photos and sensitive data when you install it. Trains run in unique patterns on railroad rails and the stations are located with long intervals at given locations. Cars run in a pattern that often means the straightest route without predictable intermediate stops on straight roads. Buses run in predetermined patterns and stops regularly at the same recurring places on straight roads. Motorcycles can drive and park on some streets, where cars or buses cannot drive or park, and arrive faster than other traffic in rush hour traffic.

This is against individuals who are already stuck in the NSA’s claws through suspicious emails and text messages. But there is a feeling of dissatisfaction for us ordinary Swenson’s that the NSA can take part of personal pictures and information about us, regardless of whether our images will be inspected by experts at the NSA or not. It is enough that someone else has access to personal images of our family members, our most intimate and most valuable.

The NSA has problems with many concerned Europeans and other world citizens outside the US being reluctant to installing or updating apps that require access to personal information and images on their cellphone. Therefore their policy have been to attract customers with a generous free storage space in the cloud. For my part, I have resigned. I download all the apps I get proposed to me now, even those that require access to sensitive data, otherwise there is a risk that I will have problems with the cellphone. Or its full function as an Android obviously gets reduced. They can have access to my entire private life, because they probably already have it anyway!

In August 2015, we probably saw the effects of the US government’s more or less openly promised ”tightening” of the section 702 program, with the upgrade to Windows 10 to make life miserable also for PC owners with Windows operating systems. Actually, it is Microsoft that collects the information, but because of the amount of information it is stored only temporarily. This does not mean that they cannot store interesting information for longer times. Nor does it mean that Microsoft does not disclose information to US authorities when they require access to sensitive information about citizens and businesses in Europe, apart from citizens and businesses in the UK of course. Everything you type on the keyboard are uploaded, including passwords, credit card numbers, content in encrypted emails, medical records, police investigations, defense secrets, etc. The dice are loaded to our disadvantage. This also means that the United States whenever they wish can get to key people, hijack their savings and, above all, steal their identity. Those who use mobile broadband will also see their monthly transmission capacity eaten up continuously when Microsoft is spying on them and uploades large amounts of your data. Even if you have deactivated the voice control, everything is immediately loaded into an activated microphone up to a number of servers.

Tape over your webcam with masking tape and turn off your microphone on your computer, that’s my advise! Because so bad has it become. Orwell’s 1984 is here for everyone except for big brother USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. You get indignant. But I can comfort myself with that in the long run, it will be the United States that loses on the wire-tapping. But the question is whether our era’s civilization is coming to an end, since there is no other nation that can take on themselves America’s former central role for God.



What are you doing to protect yourself from NSA’s, China’s and Russia’s cyber espionage? Make a multipoint list or start making plans.

Roger M. Klang, defense political Spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden


1. Who owns the Internet? Lesson eighteen

I’m not going to hold anyone on the stretch bench, the answer to the headline’s question is the US. We know that the United States can continue with its surveillance of non-American organizations and citizens online without any repercussions.

We don’t have to start a war to outmaneuver the Anglo-American axis dominance. It is sufficient enough to do two things.

i. Follow God’s will.
ii. Build a parallel Internet more free from surveillance.

It is of course no small thing to build an Internet from scratch with all its individual components and networks. But I believe that, together with most northern European countries, we can do that. France, Italy and Spain are also possible collaborators. It depends on what they can participate with. Noone here in Europe should prevent cooperation, between individual American/British academics and the Nordic countries in this project, but unfortunately Britain is too much intertwined with and favored by the United States to be considered as a trustworthy national cooperation partner. I believe that they as a state would rather counteract us than contribute to the realization of the project. This is certain because the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries are excluded from the surveillance that the United States has placed on all other countries including Germany and Sweden.

As for the facts about the US surveillance of the EU, the so-called PRISM surveillance program, we do not know much about it. You can read the following on Wikipedia;

On June 19, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama, during a visit to Germany, stated that the NSA’s data gathering practices constitute “a circumscribed, narrow system directed at us being able to protect our people”.

Wikipedia does not provide any clues about what and whom the US has been spying on, despite an exhaustive and long, obviously government authorized Wikipedia page – PRISM surveillance program. The government apparently considered it better to forestall than to get caught.

It is known that the German BND (foreign espionage) has used the American spyware XKeyscore (XKS) for analyzing but not collecting data since 2007, and German BfV (domestic intelligence) has used a test version since 2012. So the Germans secret service must have been aware of the until July 2013 secret tools for the US surveillance program. However, they did not say that they approved of the American surveillance of the European Parliament or Angela Merkel and the disclosure of their e-mail.

In May 2015, however, it appeared that much were indicating that the German BND helped the American NSA to committ industrial espionage against European industrial companies. It is therefore close at hand to think that the Americans have been able to monitor mainland Europeans, not so much because the Americans have had technological solutions, but because of the Europeans’ own cooperation with the NSA. The Americans have played European countries on the continent against each other.

We may not even need to build our own internet to stop the Prism surveillance section 702 programs. It may be sufficient to divest European intelligence organizations from cooperating with the NSA, through exposing of the Americans’ methods. But we would still probably benefit by taking technical precautions.

On the 2 of December 2013, the European Commission criticized what it calls ”US large-scale espionage against citizens, businesses and leaders” in Europe. Danish Telenor and Vice Chairman of the Norwegian Storting’s (the government) Control and Constitutional Committee, Michael Tetzschner, is upset by FRA’s (Swedish government organization equivalent to the NSA) surveillance of our neighboring countries.

I would be very surprised if the rest of the world do not do the same kind of work as FRA, and half of the world’s security services work with FRA, including Denmark’s and Norway’s security services. A large part of Russia’s communication with the outside world takes place via Swedish cables. But I do not think that FRA spies on the Storting, there are still no revealing Edward Snowden documents, which speak for Swedish espionage of that kind against friendly nations and especially not Nordic neighboring countries. We are simply better than that. As we say in Sweden when we hope for something not to happen; Pepper, pepper, knock on wood.


Axel Oxenstierna, the Swedish Royal advisor to the very successful 17:th century warrior king Gustav II Adolf, is said to once have made a remark to his son. ”Dost thou not known, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed.”

Do you think the Germans are completely bonkers who helps the NSA spy on businesses in other European countries, or do you think they are just surprisingly stupid? The Germans are the last to be invited to a US turkey dinner! It’s just mindboggling and tiering.

Can you explain how the Germans cannot see how they are working against their own interest?

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

SVR and FSB:s extraordinary authority. Lesson seventeen

Noone in the highest Russian summit in the Security Council, the President, the Prime Minister, the FSB or the SVR takes any responsibility for the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a Russian defector and former officer of the Russian FSB secret service. Non of them takes the responsibility for the death of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya. I’m going to sort this out here and now. I previously thought that Putin was directly involved in the murder of Anna Politkovskaya on October 7, 2006, but then I read that she was murdered on Putin’s birthday. 364 versus 1 that this was no coincidence. Putin would not kill Anna herself on his own birthday. It’s kind of an unofficial holiday when many Russians celebrate Putin. I can only assume this event is celebrated by many disturbed war veterans in the streets. I think it was one of them who in the spur of the moment wanted to give Putin a birthday present. Or it may have been planned, but it was not planned by Putin in that case. It is therefore quite possible that Putin does not lie when he says that he had nothing to do with Anna’s murder.

Presumably, Putin believes in what he himself says when he sort of establishes [at the time when George W Bush was president. Author’s note] that he is; “The only democrat among the leaders of the world”. But he is not. Putin cannot be blamed for every evil deed that happens in the world, but he owns the war in Ukraine. The problem is that Russia is free for some, but like a prison for others. It can be associated with life-threatening danger to express yourself in the “wrong” manner in Russia, as the situation is in so many other countries. The quote: “I disagree with what you say, but I am prepared to die for your right to say it” cannot be translated to the political life in Russia. Consequently, Russia is not a democracy. Perhaps Russia is quarter-democratic, but Thomas Jefferson once said; “Freedom of expression cannot be limited, only lost.”

That one or some of the highest-ranking members of the Russian Security Council have been involved in the death of the former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko on November 23, 2006 in London must be considered as evident. Why? Because polonium 210 is only produced on an industrial basis in one state in the whole world, namely in Russia. Russia produce only 100 grams of polonium 210 in the world on an annual basis. Polonium 210 costs 2,000,000 American dollars per gram (0.03527396 oz). Most murderers couldn’t afford it, however, a state can. Polonium 210 is an industrial product, which is used in microscopic quantities, among other things when manufacturing plastic cups for water containers and the like. Apart from states with nuclear power plants, no one can come across polonium 210 in the quantities used for the murder of Litvinenko, if he doesn’t have control over the Russian enrichment of Uranium. I assume that the Russians have control over these 100 extremely valuable grams produced per year.

And in addition, that person must have prior knowledge of the properties of the alpha-radiating polonium, such as that it is difficult to trace in a human body, that it is toxic only when swallowed or absorbed via wounds, and that it has a very short half-life in these contexts. It suggests that someone has asked scientists, or has been informed by a scientist, someone who has ambitions within Russia’s borders. It has been claimed from the Russians that one of the Russian oligarchs (read Boris Berezovsky, now living in London) has bought polonium 210 from Russia with the obscure purpose of killing Litvinenko. Interestingly, Litvinenko himself on his deathbed, pointed out Putin as his killer, and not Berezovsky who knew Litvinenko personally.

Boris Berezovsky can be acquitted by English authorities. The English know what business and productions Boris has got in England. Is polonium 210 included in any of Berezovsky’s companies products, and if so, how many decigrams, centigrams or even milligrams does he buy per year? I am sure that no radioactive material is allowed to be brought into the United Kingdom without permission, and Berezovsky has got far too much to lose to jeopardize his citizenship in England by letting some obscure person smuggle it in on his behalf. But it’s just a sidetrack in the form of a conspiracy theory that Berezovsky is guilty. The only thing that distinguishes that “theory” from an ordinary conspiracy theory is that “the theory” comes from the top of the Russian Security Council (I have put the word theory within quotation marks here, because the Russians know that they are the ones who are guilty).

Putin may not be behind the death of Litvinenko personally, but he knows who murdered him, so high up in the hierarchy must the killer be. This makes Putin a Machiavellian liar. It is noteworthy that both the murder of Anna Politkovskaya and the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko took place within less than 2 months, shortly after SVR and FSB received extended authorities, i.e. the right to kill in the service of the state.

The conclusion is that Putin must abolish the law about the right for SVR and FSB to liquidate people, who are considered a threat to Russia’s internal security within or outside the borders of the Russian Federation, if Putin wants to be a democrat as he says he is. Because if Putin knew nothing of the murder plans during the time of Litvinenko’s death, he has no control over the security organs. He has their loyalty, but he has no control over what they do. And that is entirely due to the new law from 2006, which really came into existence primarily for counteracting against the Chechen rebels first of all.

If you do not have control over the security organs, you do not control the country. Russia is a ship that sails wind for wave on the stormy waters of patriotism, and they are about to crash against the rocks. Not because they are patriotic, but because they are undemocratic and violent. I remember when Putin said, “The weak gets beaten”. It was after the failed hostage rescue in a school in Beslan in September 2004. I have pinpointed that day as the day when Putin changed his attitude from democratic thinking, to nomenclature, machiavellism and elite thinking, probably. One must not forget that it was the relatively good Boris Yeltsin who appointed Putin as Prime Minister in 1999. [This chapter was written by me in 2007, the year before the war in Georgia. Author’s Note.]

If Putin does not revise the Russian law about SVR and FSB having the right to liquidate what they call terrorists and other people, then some cold-hammered future statesman in Sweden may introduce a similar law. It is not difficult to imagine, on the above grounds, that weaker Swedish politicians who are less of statesmen, sit as in a fox trap and lets themselves be extorted, but without descending from their powerful positions because of a trivial thing like that. They constitute about 85 percent of the entire government, with the exception of Carl Bildt, who on the other hand lacks domestic as well as foreign support. He is the self-important Swede who is married to that Italian woman. Or as a high up ranking American said about C.B.; “He is a medium sized dog with a big dog attitude”. I am convinced that he is perceived like so because he represents a small state with a weak military defense that cannot back up his big mouth. I think that Carl Bildt has plenty of statesman characteristics, just a little bit less than Göran Persson’s. Jan Björklund certainly has a certain poise, but lacks important statesman characteristics just like all other pseudo-statesmen in the bourgeoise Alliance. The Alliance as a whole was and is a veritable disaster for Sweden.



Is there even a faint possibility that the murder of Alexander Litvinenko was not Russian state organized? If yes, please motivate your standpoint.

Do you see a pattern with the poisoned Russian double agent Sergei Skripal in 2018? Or am I being a slight bit paranoid? Note, I speak ironically.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

American CE-II in Poland. Lesson sixteen

Barrack Obama has previously hinted in September 2009 that he would revise the plans for a missile base in Poland, but someone had clearly managed to persuade him to pursue Bush’s plans. However, it was not a valid argument Russia Today had about the United States having so many missile bases around which could shoot down the Iranian missiles because the Iranian missiles would big circle navigate over northern latitudes (latitudes or west-east stretches) to reach the United States.

It may also be that the Americans will be forced to shoot down Iranian nuclear missiles over the Russian sky. Intercontinental nuclear weapons missiles have high parabolic trajectories and travel at a speed of 3 miles per second (6 km/s). A missile with only a kinetic effect can not easily be remote controlled in its parabolic trajectory against a target in its highest altitude that travels maybe as much as 45 degrees in the opposite direction of an enemy missile at a speed of mach 17,6 (approximately 13,000 miles per hour or 22,000 km/h) towards an American multi-million people city.

If we assume that the United States would be willing to sacrifice a substantial portion of their satellites due to the Nuclear EMP effect, in exchange for saving a big US city. A nuclear anti-nuclear missile would have to detonate as close to the enemy nuclear missile as 550 yards (500 meters) in order to stop it in its deadly trajectory. Fortunately, the American Anti-Nuclear missile CE-II Exo (Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle) has only a kinetic effect.

The Americans themselves said that they had technical difficulties with the intended missile shield in Europe.

Interestingly, Putin has not mentioned anything about that US anti-nuclear weapons missiles in the future from Poland could shoot down their targets over the Baltic countries or over Russia to intercept a hypotethic Iranian missile with its aim London. For example, from Romania or Bulgaria, you would have to shoot down an Iranian ballistic missile with its aim London over central Sweden or Norway. If the nuclear weapons missile cross the Barents Sea with its aim New York it has to be shot down approximately over Greenland. Whether the target is London or New York, the nuclear missile has to big circle navigate over parts of Russia.

It is probably so that the US missile base must be located in the Czech Republic or southern Poland, and that the US Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle then intercepts an Iranian nuclear missile with its goal New York over Greenland. Unless the nuclear missile crosses the North Sea with its target London, which in this case allows the downing of the nuclear missile over the Baltics or Russia.

The power of two more or less frontally colliding missiles partially level each others out. Plutonium exposed to friction and heat becomes strongly radioactive and radioactive material may contaminate large areas on our soil, if and when the Iranian missile is shot down in its trajectory on its way to London. That is if the plutonium does not burn up in the atmosphere.

Any trajectory missiles are detected at an early stage with e.g. satellites with IR-sensors for them to be able to intercept enemy missiles in time.

An American AN/TPY-2 ground radar is also in operation at Kürecik since 2012 in eastern Turkey, and it is an early missile warning radar station with a range of up to 620 miles (1,000 km). AN/TPY-2 is usually combined with THAAD, which has to shoot down its target “close to its belt”. THAAD is a tactical army system that is developed to shoot down short and medium-range ballistic missiles in the descending phase. But THAAD will not be able to shoot down intercontinental nuclear missiles. An AN/TPY-2 radar with its 620 miles range can not detect objects any further away than the southern Caspian Sea.

A Space-based IR sensor is required. The sensors for an interceptor launched from Poland that are to be used against nuclear targets travelling over the Greenland area must have outstanding features, since they do not even know which US city is the target. Speeding up to the nuclear missile at an angle of about 30 degrees from behind will not be easy to achieve. A mid-course radar is supposed to be located near the American missile base in southern Poland or in the Czech Republic. The interceptor must be programmed before starting. You must first know what altitude the nuclear missile is flying at and at what speed and at what stage it is in its trajectory and in exactly what direction it is flying, so that the Anti-Nuclear missile knows where to intercept it.

The Americans have less than 6 minutes of warning and preparation time if the American missile base is located in southern Poland while the Iranian is located near the Caspian Sea in the north of Iran. The Iranian nuclear missile must big circle navigate. Then the missile must be shot down somewhere over Greenland’s east coast or over the north Arctic Ocean.

The systems used for the European Missile Shield must be the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) with an Interceptor (GBI) called CE-II, as well as a land-based version of SM-3. The SM-3 is very small for an ABM, about 3,300 pounds (1,500 kg). But an interception of an Iranian missile with the SM-3 will not happen over the north Arctic Ocean, it completely falls outside of the missile’s performance capability. But with a CE-II you can shoot down an Iranian missile that has a trajectory over northern Europe, and shoot them down over the Baltics or Russia.

The CE-II can also intercept by flying over the nuclear missile and ”push” it away from its path from behind. You can read the following online (Wikipedia): “On April 30, 2014, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the system may not be operational any time soon because “its development was flawed”. It says the GBI missile is “capable of intercepting a simple threat in a limited way.” ”

With ”In a limited way”, they are likely to mean that the angle can not be too big to be able to hit the target either from the rear or from the front. The CE-II interceptor requires assistance from ground radar and space-based sensors against more complex and sophisticated targets. The CE-II interceptor has an Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).

If the Russians try to wipe out the American ground facilities in Europe with cruise missiles, I do not see how they could manage without knowing in advance when the Iranians send their nuclear weapons missiles against the United States or London.

Russia and China jointly agreed in March 2013 that they should coordinate their reaction to the United States plans to expand their missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region. The statement follows the United State’s declaration on March 16 of 2013 by Defense Minister Chuck Hagel, to abolish the construction of the fourth phase of the Missile Defense Shield in Europe in favor of a missile defense shield in Alaska, which would provide the Americans with coverage to resist a North Korean nuclear attack. One of the reasons the Americans intended to scrap phase 4, in other words the intercontinental missile shield in Europe, are the technical difficulties.


What signals do you figure that Obama was sending to Greenland, the Baltic states, Sweden and Norway as he gave a green light to building a missile shield that would effectively shoot down missiles over selected countries, considering that radioactive material would spread over wide areas, to spare London from a nuclear blast?

Or do you think the whole attempt was to keep our countries in the dark about nuclear stuff spreading over selected countries in case the US were to shoot down a nuclear missile?

Note; it is impossible to beforehand determine exactly where to shoot down a missile. The interception point depends on not controllable circumstances. So to say that ”we would shoot it down over the Baltic Sea” is not a valid argument because they do not know in advance exactly where a missile is going to be shot down.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

Where does Germany get its oil from? Lesson fifteen

Countries mentioned with the biggest partner first in order and the smallest partner last in order.


Saudi-Arabia export: China 13.6%, Japan 11.3%, India 10.7%, US 9.8%, South Korea 9.1%, Singapore 4.7% (2016)

Saudi-Arabia import: China 16.2%, US 15.0%,
Germany 6.3%, Japan 5.3%, UAE 5.0%, South
Korea 4.3% (2016)


Iran export: China 30.1%, India 16.7%, South Korea 9.7%, Turkey 9.5%, Japan 6.8% (2016)

Iran import: UAE 27.4%, China 13.2%, Turkey
7.8%, South Korea 4.3%, Germany 4.0% (2016)


Iraq export: China 25.4%, India 17.3%, US 14.3%, South Korea 12.0%, Italy 6.5%, Greece 6.1% (2016)

Iraq import: China 23.5%, Turkey 23.0%, Iran
20.0%, South Korea 5.0%, US 4.0% (2016)


Kuwait export: South Korea 16.8%, China 14.4%, Japan 9.6%, India 9.2%, US 7.5%, Singapore 5.6% (2016)

Kuwait import: China 14.1%, US 11.9%, UAE 8.3%,
Japan 6.5%, Germany 6.2%, India 5.4%, Italy 5.0%,
Saudi-Arabia 4.4%, South Korea 4.4% (2016)


Qatar export: Japan 20.0%, South Korea 15.5%, India 13.1%, China 8.2%, UAE 5.5%, Singapore 5.3% (2016)

Qatar import: US 13.7%, Germany 9.8%, UAE
9.2%, China 8.6%, Japan 7.2%, UK 5.5%, Saudi
Arabia 4.6%, Italy 4.4% (2016)


United Arab Emirates export: India 9.9%, Iran 8.9%, Japan 8.8%, Switzerland 8.5%, Oman 5.4%, China 5.1% (2016)

United Arab Emirates import: China 7.4%, US
6.9%, India 6.8%, Germany 4.4% (2016)


Bahrain export: Saudi-Arabia 18.3%, UAE 17.5%, US 11.1%, Japan 8.7%, Qatar 4.8%, China 4.2% (2016) Bahrain exports no oil.

Bahrain import: China 9.7%, US 8.6%, UAE 7.4%,
Japan 6.1%, Saudi-Arabia 5.5% (2016) Bahrain is a
net importer of oil.


Libya export: Italy 24.2%, Egypt 21.1%, Spain 9.5%, France 7.8%, Croatia 5%, Netherlands 5%, China 4.3% (2016)

Libya import: China 14.4%, South Korea 13.3%,
Turkey 10.4%, Italy 5.9% (2016)

But what about Germany? Are they to make me believe that Germany export technology to many of those countries without getting anything in return, like oil?

Sadly the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK doesn’t reveal where Germany gets most of its oil from. Apparently from none of the above countries and not from Oman, UK or Norway either. Even though Germany may still buy a percentage of oil from Norway and the United Kingdom for a few years yet, and allthough Germany buys quite much of its oil from Russia but apparently aren’t exporting much goods worth mentioning to Russia, there is a discrepancy between their exports of technology and imports of oil in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK.

The UK export quota to Germany is 10.7 percent of all exports. That’s a big share only second to their export to the US. Their import quota from Germany is 13.6 percent which amounts up to a number one place on the list. The UK produce 933,000 bbl of oil per day and export 632,200 bbl of oil per day, and of that only 154,000 bbl of oil per day are exported to Germany. That will not sustain total German oil consumption by far. Anyway, note that it is not million barrels per day, it’s only in the hundreds of thousands. The UK is Germany’s least important import partner on the important list in the book, in total 4.1 percent of Germany’s total import quota. But the UK is third on the list of Germany’s export partners after the US and France in that order.

But Germany may have put their eggs in multiple baskets. So many that they fly under the radar for oil in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. Of the 11 most important import partners Germany has, Russia isn’t mentioned. Of their 9 export partners you cannot find Russia, but you can find small countries, among them the Netherlands as number 4 in the list.

If you read on the pages for Russia’s main export partners, Germany is number 3 after the Netherlands as number 1 and China as number 2.

As Russia’s import partner number 2 after China we see Germany again. Only Russia’s GDP is 4 trillion dollars and Germany’s is 4.15 trillion dollars.

Something is clearly rotten in the state of Germany. And also in the Netherlands because for Russia the Netherlands is the number 1 export partner, but for the Netherlands Russia is only the number 6 import partner, a mere last in the mentioned list. It just doesn’t add up at all!

I need to mention that Germany exports electricity. 78.86 billion kWh exported electricity. (Germany imports 28.34 billion kWh.) Of the total installed German capacity 42.6 percent comes from fossil fuels, 5.3 percent of the total installed German capacity comes from nuclear fuels, 2.2 percent comes from hydroelectric plants and renewable sources amounts to 49.9 percent of total installed German capacity.

And this is where it gets really funny. In the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019, Germany is said to produce 8.73 billion cubic meters of gas (2015) and the book tells us that Germany import 102.5 billion cu m of gas (2015). That amounts up to 111.23 billion cu m of gas. But they export 32.51 billion cu m of gas and Germany consume 773.2 billion cu m of gas. Their own proved reserves of natural gas is only 41.99 billion cubic meters total. Oh Germany, what are you hiding? Something isn’t right.

Nord Stream is said to be operating two gas pipelines from Russia to Germany with an annual total capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of gas. Apparantly it is for each gas pipeline. Russia’s Gazprom, which supplies the gas, owns 51 percent of Nord Stream, while German, French and Dutch shareholders constitute the remaining owners. Gazprom does not need more than 51 percent of the Nord Stream shares in order for Putin to control Nord Stream in total, as Gazprom is so regimented unilaterally Kremlin loyal and its majority of CEOs are high ranking former Russian militaries posing as members of a board.

Hmm, interesting, Dutch shareholders! How much of Germany’s oil comes from Russia via the Netherlands?

Belgium is a country which has no main oil-producing import partners apart from the US and the UK who imports for their own part. Its biggest import partner is the Netherlands. Belgium imports 639,500 bbl of oil per day. This I suspect should mainly come from Russia via the Netherlands since Russia is not mentioned as one of Belgium’s 7 most important import partners. The UK is the number 5 in declining order. Belgium’s main export partner is Germany, but Belgium doesn’t seem to export any oil, only refined petroleum products according to the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019. They have no natural gas production but they consume 23.01 billion cu m of gas (2015) and they export 1.694 billion cu m of gas (2015). They import 18.81 billion cubic meter of gas (2015) according to the factbook. The import of gas comes from the UK. They are not among Russias 6 main export or 6 main import partners mentioned in the factbook. They are likely to buy their oil from someone who buys it from Russia in their turn.

But to be fair, it is not uncommon for the numbers not to add up in the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. It is the same for the UK regarding gas-production, gas-imports, gas-exports and gas-consumption, only not as significant as it is for Germany.

Germany imports 1.837 million bbl of oil per day, a nr 6 in the world. Crude oil proved reserves is only 145.4 million bbl of oil.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaian should according to sane security policy reasonably belong to the ’Russian quota’ since Russia controls the oil pipelines to e.g. Leningrad Oblast. At least as long as there is no oil pipeline in Turkey not controlled by Russia. Germany’s own data from the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) regarding the 33 million tonnes of oil (i.e. 240 million bbl) imported from Russia should instead amount to 43+ million tonnes (i.e. 312+ million bbl) as Germany according to the statistics import 8 million tonnes (i.e. 58+ million bbl) from Kazakhstan and 2 million tonnes (i.e. 14.5+ million bbl) from Azerbaijan.

And most of the oil imported to Germany from the Netherlands should probably also be accounted to import from Russia. But the Netherlands despite being Germany’s number one import partner is belonging to the column called ”Rest of world (-12 countries)”. This shouldn’t be. It should belong to the Russian column and almost all of the oil in the last column must come via the Netherlands. There is just no other way to interpret all the information in this article, and even then it doesn’t add up nearly as good as it should have. As I have said, Russia’s number one export partner is the Netherlands, two places above Germany on the list, and if Germany imports 312 million bbl a year from Russia, ¾ of that which is exported from Russia to the Netherlands, and Germany’s main import partner is the Netherlands… Well, you do the math!

According to the Swedish security blogger Cornucopia? Sweden imports 394,000 bbl of oil a day (2016). That equals 54+ thousand tonnes a day or 19.7+ million tonnes a year. 45 percent of that crude oil comes from Russia and 26 percent comes from Norway.

Since Norway’s export to Germany is nearly exactly twice as much as their export to Sweden according to the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019, our 26 percent oil qouta bought from Norway i.e. 102,440 bbl, should land at 205,000 bbl of Norwegian oil bought by Germany. And it does according to the BMWi.

Since Germany’s total import of oil is 1.837 million bbl of oil per day and the import of oil from Russia is 312+ million bbl per year or 854,795 bbl of oil per day, then the remainder is 982,205 bbl per day they have to get from somewhere else than Russia. As I have stated, 205,000 bbl per day comes from Norway and about 175,000 bbl a day comes from the UK to Germany. That adds up to 602,205 bbl of crude oil they have to get from the rest of the countries on the list above. What they have to get from the rest equals almost 1/3 or 29 percent of the total oil import from every other nation but Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaian, Norway and the UK. The Norwegian and British oil is Brent-oil used to make gasoline from and Germany’s vehicle park is mainly running on diesel.

Sources; CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2018-2019; and the blog Cornucopia?; and the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi)

If the numbers in a source lacks a year attached to it it is always to be understood as the year 2016


I want to emphasize that when putting a point in a number followed by the word ”million” like this; 1.837 million, it means 1 837 000. When putting commas in a number like this; 1,602,205 it means that it is the full number 1 602 205 and it is not followed by the word ”million”.

How do you interprete the numbers? Are the Germans hiding something you think?

Or do you think that the numbers are legit? Please motivate your standpoint.

For this task you may use the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK as much as you wish.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden


Sweden. Lesson fourteen

The S-400 Triumph Air defense systems based in Kaliningrad Oblast are now operational in Kaliningrad. The S-400 radar is capable of tracking over a 100 targets at a distance of more than 400 kilometers and take on 12 of these 100 goals at varying ranges, depending on the type of missile used. The missiles that can be used have a range of 400, 250 or 120 km. The 400-kilometer missile can reportedly fly at Mach 12 (9,100 miles/h or 14,700 km/h) with a 40,000 to 50,000-meter maximum flight altitude and must be shot down at high or medium altitude. The S-400 Triumph System is optimized to shoot down either ballistic missiles or cruise missiles but can also be used against signals surveillance aircraft and radar planes like AWACS. The 400 km missile is said to be able to shoot down even fighter/attack-aircrafts. S-400 Triumph’s Nato report name is SA-21 Growler. The Russians can also utilize fighter aircraft with the R-37 Vympel missiles with a range of 300 km against AWACS.

A ballistic missile is always a surface to surface missile. Iskander-M is actually a semi-ballistic missile, i.e. its flightpath is within the stratosphere. It may be worth considering when discussing range. To fully flee the earth’s gravity it requires a minimum speed of 11 km/s. A rule of thumb is that the lower trajectory up to 45 degrees, the shorter the range of a missile, given the same conditions in other prestanda. A lower trajectory also means that Iskander-M can maneuver throughout its whole flightpath within the stratosphere. Iskander-M can be preprogrammed to avoid air defense missiles by a series of pirouettes in its final phase. The Russians claim that the Iskander-M missile cannot be shot down due to its maneuverability. It would be helpful if we could figure out in what phase of its trajectory one should try to shoot down an Iskander-M, so that it at least isn’t in the phase where it maneuvers the jerkiest when our air defense missile reaches it. I guess time of impact depends on what type of air defense missile system we use.

Most analysts now (2015) assume that the Iskander extended range version with a range of over 600 km must be the Iskander-K cruise missile and not the ballistic missile Iskander-M. Maybe so. But the range of Iskander-M tends to be lowered following after what the Kremlin says for political reasons. Today, many here in Sweden say that the Iskander-M has a range of 400 km. I don’t think so! Additionally, the range of the Iskander-K is most likely also violating the INF agreement, even if the missile is carrying a heavier nuclear warhead.

Should Russia forebode a threat in Europe, specifically an American missile shield, they will take themselves the right to permanently deploy Iskander-M in Kaliningrad Oblast, from which it will pose a threat to Poland and also Germany, not to mention Sweden. The Russian military spokesman, then Colonel Andrey Bobrun, said that the extended Iskander missile is designed for operations against land-based targets such as command centers, force groups, air and missile defense facilities and aircraft at airfields. He also said that; “The weapon systems have high tactical maneuverability and can be delivered [He should mean be transported] by all types of delivery systems, including from aircraft “.

What is most foreboding with Iskander-M is that, in its extended version, it probably covers the Stockholm area within its reach from Kaliningrad. It’s called 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) – Extended Range Version Program, which Putin developed after Bush’s proclamation of America’s right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes and his intended missile base in Poland.

The missiles warhead generally weighs more if it is nuclear, i.e. approximately 750 kg versus 480-700 kg if it’s conventional, so paradoxically it will be the Iskander missile carrying a conventional warhead that clearly violates the INF agreement. It may therefore be that Russia wishes to abolish the INF Treaty for the possibility of extending the range of Iskander-M with conventional explosive charges.

The head of the Russian General Staff, Nikolaj Makarov stated in an article published on November 17, 2011 in the Washington Post that; “Under certain circumstances, local and regional conflicts may escalate into a full-scale war, involving nuclear weapons.” Can it be said any clearer? Putin may have his aim at small non-nuclear and non-NATO countries like Sweden, Finland and Georgia when he spoke of preventive Russian attacks, if Iskander has a range of >500 kilometers with a 750 kg nuclear charge.

Immediately after Makarov’s statement, in November 2011, Russian President Dimitrj Medvedev showed up on Russia Today’s network television media and mentioned in passing the number 500 kilometer range of Iskander-M missiles in conjunction with a declaring that Russia will be forced to resign from the START Treaty if the missile base is built in Poland, and he also mentioned that Russia may or may not build its own missile shield. This figure, 500 km, is completely contrary to what has been said from Russian authorities earlier on. We can only hope that the Russians have reconsidered now. But the core point with an extended range version is that it has a longer range than the previous Iskander-M missile which satisfied the INF agreement.

U.S. Colonel (retired) Sam Gardiner, believes it is unlikely that West at this time has the political will to raise the issue of Iskander on the agenda. The question does not raise interest even in military circles. Gardiner raised the question of Iskander’s range in a seminar he held in both Stockholm and Tallinn for the air force in the region, as well as in the USAF headquarters in Germany. As for the reactions, “he could as well have been talking about the price of oranges on the Asian market,” he said in a private conversation in 2010.



What do you think is more important to Putin with the Iskander-M, to deliver nuclear strikes or to deliver conventional strikes? Motivate your standpoint.

Note that this is more of a philosophical question than a strategic. I want to stimulate your cognition.

Roger M. Klang, defense political spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden

Strategic maskirovka Vs. tactical and operational maskirovka. Lesson thirteen

The importance of strategic maskirovka should not be underestimated, but I personally see it as a second-rate protection measure. I’m not saying I’m ignoring it and never would agree to it, but I’m reluctant to introduce pure strategic maskirovka and prefer open cards. It is probably a national trait.

Maskirovka at a tactical and operational level is a completely different matter. For Swedish conditions it could be about camouflage, heat camouflage, heat dissipation, invisibility cloaks by systems that can imitate the surrounding temperature, and for operational level the spreading of airbases and aircontrol centers and the like. I am entirely for that. But it is symptomatic that the only central and overall strategic plan where the Allies proved to be significantly superior in WWII were during the initial invasion of Normandy, and the planning preceding Normandy.

What preceded the invasion in the form of a major deception with two smokescreens called Operation Bodyguard and Operation Fortitude, however, was not a result of superiority in strategic thinking, but a sneaking and shuffling of the cards and pure luck for the Allies side during the planning, if you ask me.

It was because of the enormous magnitude of the deception, that it was pure luck that they succeeded. A single unfortunate observation by a German agent or by a traitor could have sunk parts of the plan. It didn’t make it any less cunning. It were all about masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and fake signaling.

I also mention that deceptive bombings, staniol tape felling (also called Chaff or Window) to deceive radar systems and large scale air drops of rubber dolls were carried out during D-day from bases in the south-east of England to the Calais area in France. Masking, dummies, deceptive traffic and maybe fake signaling were just forms of regular strategic maskirovka. But the fake signaling costed little in energy, manpower and working hours and was therefore well worth it.

Fake signaling can be switched on to true signaling at a certain point in time or action, and you may be exposed at a later stage of an invasion. The deceptive bombings, the staniol tape felling and the rubber dolls were operational maskirovka and were all justified. The Allies took the Germans by surprise on D-day as they intended to do.

The Germans were themselves devoted to strategic maskirovka on Normandy’s beaches. This made the Allied strategic Maskirovka pointless. Sure enough, the Allies sometimes landed were they could not achieve their intended goal because the target wasn’t there, and in some cases they would land at the wrong place or in dangerous places like the beach strip dubbed Omaha.


The strategic level is about how to win a war. The operational level is about how to win a campaign. The tactical level is about how to win a battle.

Do you think it is meaningless to divide the meaning of Maskirovka into strategic, operational and tactical like I did here? If yes, please motivate your standpoint.

If you think it is meaningful, do you agree on that it was pointless for the Allies to pursue their strategic maskirovka? If no, please motivate your standpoint.

Roger M. Klang, defense political Spokesman for the Christian Values Party (Kristna Värdepartiet) in Sweden